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Granting network providers pricing flexibility should reduce
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of retreating from the forefront of the
policy debate. President Obama effec-
tively ensured that network neutrality
will remain at the top of the policy agenda by including pro-
visionsinthe2009stimuluspackagethatrequiretheFederal
CommunicationsCommissiontoformulateanationalbroad-
band plan. The stimulus package also requires that grants
madebytheNationalTelecommunicationsandInformation
Administration comply with four network neutrality princi-
ples first articulated by the fcc in 2005. On October 22,
2009,thefccinitiatedproceedingstocodifyandexpandthe
2005 principles. President Obama reaffirmed his support
for network neutrality in a YouTube interview conducted
shortly after his 2010 State of the Union address.
Pinningdownaprecisedefinitionofnetworkneutralityis
difficult. Roughly speaking, it requires network providers to





like Internet content must be treated alike and move at the
same speed over the network.”
Itwouldbesurprisingifanytwosimilarpacketswouldbe
treated exactly alike when traveling through a network con-
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sistingofmorethan30,000autonomoussystemsthatdeter-
mine their terms of interconnection through arms-length
negotiations. Indeed, many commentators have noted that
such equal treatment did not occur over much of the
Internet’s past, when it was far less complex. Now, systemat-
ic changes in the architecture of the Internet make identical
treatment even less likely, yet the changes are largely the
resultofnetworkproviders’attemptstoreducecost,manage
congestion, and maintain quality of service. These changes
may not represent network providers’ efforts to promote
their self interests at the expense of the public, as some net-
workneutralityproponentshavesuggested,butinsteadthey
have the potential to yield substantial benefits both to indi-
vidual consumers and to society as a whole.
THE EARLY INTERNET
When the Internet first emerged, its topology and the busi-
ness relationships comprising it were relatively simple. The
Internet evolved out of the National Science Foundation’s
nsfnet backbone, which was created in 1986 (and decom-
missioned in 1997) to provide universities all over the coun-
try with access to federally funded supercomputing centers
located at five major universities. The primary architects of
nsfnetdecidedtogiveitatripartitestructure.Atthetopwas
thensfnetbackbone,whichatitspeakconnected16research
facilities across the country. At the bottom were the campus
networks run by individual universities. In the middle were
regionalnetworks(typicallyoperatedbyuniversityconsortia
orstate-universitypartnerships)thatlinkedthecampusnet-
works to the major computing centers.
Everydatapackethadtotravelthroughaparallelpathtra-
versing each level of the hierarchy. For example, traffic orig-
inatingononecampusnetworkwouldhavetoconnecttothe
regional network with which it was associated, which hand-Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585269




























ed off the traffic to the nsfnet backbone, which in turn
handed it off to the regional network that served the desti-




at the top of the hierarchy was replaced by a series of private
backboneprovidersthatinterconnectedwithoneanotherat
fourpublicnetworkaccesspointsestablishedbytheNational
Science Foundation. The campus networks at the bottom of
thehierarchywerereplacedbylast-mileprovidersthattrans-
ported traffic from local distribution facilities located in
individualcities(whichinthecaseofdigitalsubscriberlines
are usually called “central offices” and in the case of cable
modemsystemsareusuallycalled“headend”)toendusers’res-
idencesandplacesofbusiness.Theregionalnetworksevolved
into regional Internet service providers (isps) that trans-
portedtrafficbetweenthefournetworkaccesspointsserved
by backbone providers and the central offices and headends
maintained by last-mile providers.The privatization of the Internet did not change the hier-
archicalnatureofthebasicarchitecture.Eachregionalispstill
connected to a single backbone provider, and each last-mile
provider still connected to a single regional isp. Indeed, the
early versions of the routing protocol employed by the back-
bones (known as “border gateway protocol”) would not sup-
port more complex topologies.
This architecture conferred a number of advantages. It
constituteda“spanningtree”thatconnectedallofthenodes
with the minimum number of links. Furthermore, the fact
thatthepathbetweenanytwonodeswasuniquegreatlysim-
plified determining the path along which traffic should be
routed. That said, tree architectures are also subject to a
number of drawbacks. The uniqueness of the path connect-
ing any two nodes means that the failure of any link or node
in the network will inevitably disconnect part of the net-




riorate. In addition, the hierarchical structure made each
network participant completely dependent on the players
operating at the level above them, which in turn provided
backbones with a potential source of market power.
Peering and Transit The early Internet was also character-
ized by relatively simple business relationships. End users
typicallypurchasedInternetaccessthroughsomeformof“all-
you-can-eat” pricing, which allowed them to consume as
much bandwidth as they would like for a single flat rate.
Relationshipsbetweennetworkproviderstypicallyfellintotwo
categories. Tier-1 isps entered into “peering” relationships
with one another, in which they exchanged traffic on a set-
tlement-freebasisandnomoneychangedhands.Theprimary
justification for foregoing payment is transaction costs.
Although the backbones could meter and bill each other for
thetraffictheyexchanged,theycouldavoidthecostofdoing
so without suffering any economic harm so long as the traf-
fic they exchanged was roughly symmetrical; such arrange-
mentswouldnotbeeconomicalifthetrafficbeingexchanged
were severely imbalanced. Thus tier-1isps will not peer with
othernetworksthatareunabletomaintainaminimumlevel
of traffic volume. In addition, peering partners typically
require that inbound and outbound traffic not exceed a cer-
tain ratio. Networks that cannot meet these requirements
mustenterinto“transit”arrangementsinwhichtheypaythe
backbone to provide connectivity to the rest of the Internet.
Most early analyses of these arrangements focused on
their financial terms. What is often overlooked is that inter-
connection agreements covered two distinct functions: the
sending and receiving of traffic, and the announcing to the
rest of the Internet where ip addresses served by various
providers are located. To understand this latter function,
consider the perspective of a small network, A, that serves a
small number of its own customers and purchases access to
the rest of the Internet through another isp. The transit
agreementbetweenAandtheispwouldnotonlyrequirethe
isptoreceivetrafficsentbyAandtodelivertrafficboundto
A, but also require the isp to announce to the rest of the
InternethowtoreachtheipprefixesassociatedwithA’scus-
tomers. In addition, A can maintain a very simple routing
table—itneedonlykeeptrackoftheprefixesofthecustomers
that it serves; for all ip addresses outside of A, it can enter a
“defaultroute”intoitsroutingtablethatdirectsallothertraf-
fic to the otherisp.
The existence of default routes creates a potential prob-
lem. If none of the routing tables involved in a particular
routingsessioncontainedthelocationofthedestination,by
defaultthenetworkswouldsimplyhandthepacketsbackand
forth continuously and the packets would never reach their
final destination. The only way to avoid this problem is for
one or more network providers to maintain routing tables
that map the entire Internet without employing any default
routes. Thus, tier-1isps are defined not only by their engag-
ing in settlement-free peering with one another, but also by
their maintaining routing tables that contain no defaults.
Peering contracts also include a number of other require-
ments to guard against free riding and to ensure the proper
functioning of the network.
THE INTERNET’S EVOLUTION
Overthepastdecade,ispshavebeguntoenterintomorecom-
plex interconnection arrangements that deviate from the
stricttripartitehierarchythatcharacterizedtheearlyInternet.
In addition, content providers have begun to experiment
with a variety of ways to locate their content closer to end
users.Bothtypesofchangeshavesignificantimplicationsthat
have largely been overlooked in the policy debate.
Private Peering, Multihoming, and Secondary Peering Oneof
the first problems to emerge in the early Internet was con-
gestionatthefournetworkaccesspoints,whichoftencaused
throughput times and network reliability to degrade. Some
estimate that this congestion caused packet loss at rates as
high as 40 percent. As the network access points became
increasingly congested, backbones began to find it advanta-
geous to exchange traffic at private interconnection points,
a practice known as “private peering.”
In addition, regionalisps have begun to connect to more
than one backbone, a practice known as “multihoming,” in
part to protect against service outages and to limit their vul-
nerability to any exertion of market power by a backbone.
Regionalispsthatdidnothavesufficientvolumetopeerwith
thetier-1backbonesalsobegantofindthattheydidhavesuf-
ficient volume to peer with other regional isps, a practice
known as “secondary peering.” Enabling regional isps to
exchange traffic on a settlement-free basis reduced the costs
borne by end users. In addition, secondary peering would
often shorten the number of hops needed for particular
packets to reach their final destination and make them sub-
jecttobilateral(asopposedtomultiparty)negotiations,both
of which should increase networks’ control over quality of
service. Secondary peering and multihoming also made the
network more robust by creating multiple paths through
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ing tables. For similar reasons, a network may intentionally
routetrafficoveramorecostlypathifdoingsowillhelpitmain-





but rather from networks’ attempts to minimize costs and
ensurequalityofserviceinthefaceofanetworktopologythat
is increasingly heterogeneous.
Server Farms and CDNS Large content providers have
begun to employ other means to reduce cost and manage
latency. One solution is to forgo maintaining a single large
server and instead to deploy multiple points of presence in
“carrier hotels” across the country. Doing so allows these
contentproviderstoavoidpayingtransitchargestoreachthe
public backbone and instead transmit their traffic through
secondary peering arrangements with tier-2 isps. Greater
relianceonprivatenetworksalsogivesthecontentproviders
greater control over network security and performance. A
recentstudyindicatesthatGoogle,Yahoo!,andMicrosofthave
been able to use server farms to bypass the backbone alto-
gether for roughly a third of their traffic, and to keep their
number of hops for traffic that had to pass through the
backbone to no more than one or two.
On other occasions, content providers are distributing
their data through “content delivery networks” (cdns) such
asAkamaiandLimelight.cdnsineffectsubstitutestoragefor
long-distancenetworkingcapacitybymaintaininganetwork
of local caches across the Internet. When an end user sends a
requestforawebpagehostedbyacdn,thatqueryisredirected
to the cache. cdns are thus able to use storage to serve mul-
tiple queries for the same content without using significant
network resources. The geographic dispersion of the caches
usually dictates that the file will be served by a location clos-
er than would be possible if all of the content were stored in
a central server, which minimizes cost and latency. The dis-
tributednatureofthecachesalsoprovidesprotectionagainst
denial-of-serviceattacksandallowsthecdntoredirectqueries
to other caches when particular caches are overly congested.
cdnsrepresentaninnovativewaytodealwiththeincreas-
ing complexity of the Internet. The problem is that they are
nonneutral. cdns work best for static content; they are less




with one another without passing through the public back-
bone.Thishadtheadditionalbenefitofweakeningthemar-
ket position of the top-tier backbones, since any breakdown
inthebusinessrelationshipwouldnotnecessarilydisconnect
the isp from the network and the ability to route along dif-
ferent paths places a natural limit on the backbones’ ability
to engage in supracompetitive pricing.
Theemergenceofinterconnectionrelationshipsthatdevi-
ate from the strict hierarchy that characterized the early
Internet represents a substantial divergence from network
neutrality. For example, assume that an end user is down-
loadingcontentfrombothcnn.comandmsnbc.com.Assume
furtherthattheenduser’sregionalisphasasecondarypeer-
ing relationship with the regional isp serving cnn.com, but
does not have a secondary peering relationship with the
regionalispservingmsnbc.com.Theabsenceofasecondary
peeringrelationshipmeansthattrafficfrommsnbc.comwill
have to pay transit charges, while traffic from cnn.com will
not. The result is that traffic that is functionally identical
will end up paying different amounts. The differences in
topology may also allow the traffic from cnn.com to main-
tain greater control over the quality of service.
Thepresenceofmultipleroutesbetweenthesetwopoints
alsocomplicatesroutingdecisions.Thepresenceofmultiple
paths connecting two points naturally means that someone
mustdecidealongwhichpathtoroutethetraffic.Although
most networks choose routes that minimize the number of
hops,networksmaysometimesfinditbeneficialtoroutetraf-
fic in order to satisfy other requirements of their intercon-
nection relationships. For example, a network may seek to
enhance efficiency by balancing the loads between the two
links. Multihomed entities can also monitor the quality of
service provided by each connection and route the most
delay-sensitive traffic along the link with the lowest latency.
Inaddition,transitcontractscallforcustomerstopayaflat
fee up to a predetermined peak volume (known as the com-
mitted rate) and pay additional charges for any volume that
exceedsthatlevel.Forthesamereasonthatconsumerswithtwo
mobile telephones have the incentive to use up all of the pre-
paidminutesonbothlinesbeforeincurringanyadditionalper-
minutecharges,multihomedentitieshavetheincentivetouti-
lize all of their committed rate before paying additional fees.
Thislowersoveralltransitcost,butrequiresdivertingsometraf-
ficalongapaththatislongerthantheonestoredintherout-
Secondary peering and multihoming have
the benefit of weakening the market position
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reliabilityandqualityofserviceareavailableonlytothosewho
are willing to pay for them.
Totheextentthatcdnsusethepublicbackbonetodeliv-
erthecontenttotheircaches,theyarebestregardedasanover-
lay to the existing network. Increasingly, however,cdns and
serverfarmsarebypassingthepublicbackbonealtogetherand
connecting to their caches through private networks, in the
process transforming cdns into a fundamentally different
architecture.
All of these developments represent innovative adjust-
mentstotherealitiesoftheInternet.Thedifferencesintopol-
ogy mean that traffic that is otherwise similar may travel
throughthenetworkatdifferentspeeds,withdifferentcosts,
and with different levels of quality of service.




of these innovations have been driven by the increasing sig-
nificanceofpeer-to-peertechnologies.Otherimportantdevel-
opments are partial transit and paid peering.
Peer-To-Peer One of the primary forces causing business
relationships to change is the growing importance of appli-
cations using peer-to-peer technologies. The traditional
Internet employed what is known as a client-server architec-
ture, in which files are stored in large computers at central-
ized locations (servers) and end users (clients) request files
from those computers. The relationship is generally regard-
edashierarchical,andtheamountofdatauploadedbyclients
is very small relative to the amount of data downloaded by
servers. In the classic example of the World Wide Web, client
trafficconsistssolelyofuniformresourcelocators(urls),the
short bits of code identifying a particular website address.
Server traffic, which consists of the data comprising the
requested website, is much larger. For this reason, the tech-
nologies that took the early lead in broadband deployment
(cablemodemserviceanddsl)adaptedanasymmetricarchi-




Edge computers in a peer-to-peer architecture are not divid-
ed into those that host files and those that request files.
Instead,computerssimultaneouslyperformbothfunctions.
Becausethisrelationshipisregardedaslesshierarchicalthan
client-server relationships, the computers in this architec-
ture are known as peers and communications between them
are known as peer-to-peer. Peer-to-peer is thus not synony-
mous with file sharing or user-generated content, as is often
mistakenly assumed. On the contrary, many peer-to-peer
applications (such as Vuze) support commercial broadcast
services, and many platforms for user-generated content
(such as YouTube) employ centralized servers. The real sig-
nificance of the term “peer-to-peer” lies in the nature of the
network architecture.
It is not yet clear what proportion of network traffic will
follow each architecture. For example, peer-to-peer traffic
had consistently outstripped client-server traffic for several
years leading up to 2007. In 2007, however, client-server traf-





next several years. Even so, it is clear that peer-to-peer traffic
is likely to remain a more important component of network
traffic than during the Internet’s early years.
The growing importance of peer-to-peer technologies is
causingsignificantcongestionincertainareasofthenetwork
and is putting pressure on the traditional approach to pric-





puters in a peer-to-peer architecture can generate traffic for
aslongasthecomputerisleftrunning.Theresultisthatthe
lion’s share of upload traffic is generated by a small number
of superheavy peer-to-peer users. As few as 5 percent of end
usersmayberesponsibleforgeneratingmorethan50percent
of all Internet traffic.





of congestion associated with the network connection
attached to that end user’s computer. Technologies such as
BitTorrent follow a different approach. Instead of storing
entire files in one location, BitTorrent divides each file into
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The differences in topology mean that
traffic that is otherwise similar may travel through
the network at different speeds, with different costs.pieces and distributes them at multiple locations around
theInternet.WhenaBitTorrentuserrequestsafile,thesoft-
ware then retrieves the various pieces from multiple com-
puters at the same time, which reduces the amount of band-
width required from any one peer and improves download
performance.BitTorrentalsodynamicallyreallocatesrequests
forpiecesawayfromtheslowestconnectionsandtowardthe
fastest connections, thereby placing the heaviest burden on
those peers with the fast connections.
Thecongestioncausedbypeer-to-peertechnologiesweighs
heaviestonlast-miletechnologiesthatsharebandwidthlocal-
ly, such as cable modem and wireless broadband systems.
For example, cable modem technology requires that sub-
scribers share bandwidth with the other households operat-
ing through the same neighborhood node. As a result, cable
modem customers are significantly more vulnerable to the
downloading habits of their immediate neighbors than are
telephone-based broadband systems, which offer dedicated
local connections. Service can slow to a crawl if as few as 15
of the 500 or so users sharing the same node are using peer-
to-peer applications to download files.
The classic economic solution to congestion is to set the







amounts of bandwidth may nonetheless impose significant
congestioncostsonthenetworkiftheygeneratetrafficatpeak
times. The contribution of any particular usage cannot be
determined simply by counting the number of bits being
transmitted. The overall impact of any particular increase in
network usage can only be determined in light of other sub-
scribers’Internetusage.Thusitmaymakesensetochargedif-
ferent amounts to users who are using the Internet to access
thesamecontentorapplicationifasufficientnumberofother
users sharing the same bandwidth are using the network at
the same time.
The growth of peer-to-peer technologies has also height-
enedthepressureonthemodelsthatnetworkprovidershave
used to price their services. As noted earlier, the traditional
approach charges content and application providers prices
thatincreasewiththepeakbandwidthconsumed,whileend
users are charged on an unmetered basis. The fact that every
downloadhadtopassthroughonelinkthatchargedonavol-
ume-sensitivebasisallowedthispricingapproachtoserveas
a reasonable approximation of efficient congestion pricing.
Forexample,100downloadsofa700megabytemoviewould
generate 70 gigabytes of traffic from the server, which in
turn would be reflected in the price paid by the content
provider to itsisp.
The situation is quite different under peer-to-peer archi-
tecture. In that case, the movie could be downloaded once
from the server, and the remaining 99 downloads could be
served by other end users running the same peer-to-peer
software. Because end users are provided with service on an
all-you-can-eat basis, the additional 99 downloads served
by the peer-to-peer network do not generate any additional
revenue. The only revenue received by the network is for the
initial700megabytedownload.Thus,inapeer-to-peerarchi-
tecture, the amounts that content providers pay under the
traditional pricing regime no longer serve as a workable
approximation of the total traffic they impose on the net-
work. Moreover, the failure to charge network participants
prices that reflect their incremental contribution to con-
gestion causes excessive consumption of network resources
that ultimately harms consumers.
It thus comes as no surprise that the network providers
that are most subject to local congestion are experimenting
withothermeansformanagingthecongestioncausedbypeer-
to-peer applications. For example, Time Warner has recently
experimented with bandwidth caps and other forms of
metered pricing. Although many network neutrality propo-
nents have no objection to metered pricing, recent attempts
to impose metered pricing and bandwidth caps have met
such a hostile reaction from the network neutrality commu-
nitythatthenetworkprovidershadtobackdown.Thatsaid,
metered pricing is far from a panacea. As I have discussed in
greaterdetailelsewhere,truecongestion-basedpricingwould
vary from moment to moment based on the volume of traf-
fic introduced into the network by other users. Such a pric-
ingregimewouldchallengeconsumers’abilitytoprocessthe
relevant information, and the distributed nature of the
Internetmeansthatnooneentityhastheinformationneed-
ed to formulate such policies. As a result, other network
providers have turned to proxies that are strongly associated
withhigh-volumeactivity,whichmostimportantlyincludes
a ban on operating a server as required by peer-to-peer tech-
nologies. Although this would constitute a violation of net-
workneutralitybydiscriminatingagainstaparticulartypeof
application, even network neutrality proponents acknowl-
edgethatsucharestrictionrepresentsagoodproxyforband-
width-intensive activity.
Partial Transit and Paid Peering Network providers have
alsobeguntoenterintobusinessrelationshipsthatgobeyond
peering and transit relationships that dominated the early
Internet. Some are driven by the emergence of secondary
peering relationships discussed above. Before such relation-
ships existed, a tier-2 or tier-3 isp would have to buy transit
from a tier-1 isp that had obtained access to all of the ip
addressesthatitdidnotserve.Inotherwords,atier-2ortier-
3 isp’s transit relationships would cover the entire Internet
(except for its own customers).
The advent of secondary peering reduces the scope of
transit services that the isp needs to purchase. The isp no
longer needs to buy transit to the entire Internet; the sec-
ondarypeeringrelationshipsalreadyprovidetheispwiththe
abilitytoreachthosecustomersservedbyitssecondarypeer-
ing partners. As a result, these isps have begun to purchase
partialtransitthatcoversonlythoseportionsoftheInternet
notalreadycoveredbytheirsecondarypeeringrelationships.
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In addition, an isp with inbound traffic that far exceeds its
outboundtrafficmayruntheriskofhavingtrafficratiosthat
put it in violation of its peering contract. Under these cir-
cumstances, it may attempt to cover its deficit in outbound
trafficbysellingapartialtransitcontractthatcoversonlyout-
bound traffic, but not inbound traffic. Alternatively, it may




peering relationships. Peers announce to the rest of the
Internet the addresses that their peering partners control,
maintain a sufficient number of interconnection points
across the country, and maintain the requisite total volume
andtrafficratios.Thekeydifferenceisthatonepeeringpart-
ner pays the other partner for its services.
Paidpeeringisdrivenbybothsupply-sideanddemand-side
considerations. Starting first with the supply side, settle-
ment-free peering arrangements between tier-1 isps with
similar traffic volumes make sense only if both networks
havesimilarcosts.Overtime,backboneshavebeguntoserve
twodifferenttypesoflast-milenetworks:thosesuchasCogent
and Abovenet that primarily serve content and application
providers (which are sometimes called “content networks”),
and those such as Comcast and Verizon that serve end users
(whicharesometimescalled“eyeballnetworks”).Thecostsof
the first type of network are quite low, typically only requir-
ingasinglehigh-speedlinetoasmallnumberofbusinessloca-
tions. The costs of the second type of network are consider-
ablyhigher,requiringthewiringandupgradingofequipment
in entire neighborhoods. The presence of such asymmetric
costsprovidesasubstantialimpetusforcashtoflowfromnet-
worksservingcontentandapplicationproviderstonetworks
providing connections to end users.
Thesesupply-sideconsiderationsarereinforcedbydemand-
side considerations associated with the economics of two-
sided markets, which illustrates the potential benefits of
allowing network providers to charge differential prices to
both end users and content and application providers.
Conventionaleconomicshaslongrecognizedtheexistenceof
“networkeconomiceffects,”whichcauseanetworktoincrease
in value as the number of users connected to it increases. To
use a classic example, the value of a telephone network to a
particularconsumerdependsinpartonthenumberofother
subscribers connected to the network; the more people you
canreachthroughthenetwork,themorevaluableitbecomes.
The benefits created by the network economic effect for
telephonenetworksarisewithrespecttoasingleclassofcus-
tomers. When a market is two-sided, instead of bringing
together a single class of similarly situated users, networks
bring together two completely different classes of users. In
thosecases,thevalueisdeterminednotbythenumberofusers
of the same class, but rather by the number of users of the
other class. A classic example is broadcast television, which
brings together two groups: viewers and advertisers.
Advertisersgainnobenefit(andifanythingsufferadetriment)
from belonging to a network with a large number of other
advertisers.Thevalueofthenetworkforadvertisersisinstead
determinedsolelybythenumberofviewers,i.e.,thesizeofthe
other class of users.
The literature suggests that social welfare would be max-
imized if the network provider were permitted to price dis-
criminate on both sides of the two-sided market. It also sug-
gests that the prices paid on each side of the market can
differ widely, and that in many cases it is economically ben-





tiser’s willingness to pay for an ad on a particular website
depends on the number of end users viewing that website.
Under these circumstances, the optimal solution may be for
thewebsiteownertosubsidizethetotalnumberofendusers
by making payments to the network provider to help defray
theircostsofconnection.Thecostsofsubsidizingmoreusers
would be more than offset by the additional revenue gener-
ated by the fact that advertisers can now reach more poten-
tial customers. In the case of broadband, this would be both
economically efficient and would be a boon to consumers
both in terms of providing service in more geographic areas
and in reducing the prices that consumers pay.
These dynamics are again well illustrated by broadcast
television.Inmanyways,broadcasttelevisionandtheInternet
are analogous. The studios that create television programs
play a similar role to content and application providers.




networks. In addition, the revenue structure is quite compa-
rable, in that television networks receive advertising revenue
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Social welfare would be maximized
if the network provider could price discriminate
on both sides of the two-sided market.in much the same manner as content and application
providers.Furthermore,thecoststructureissomewhatsim-
ilar in that connecting individual homes is much more cost-
ly than distributing programming nationally.
Fordecades,thestandardbusinessarrangementhasbeen
for television networks to subsidize the operations of local
broadcaststationsbypayingthemtobemembersoftheirtel-
evision networks. The industry’s revenue and cost structure
make such arrangements quite logical. The cost of paying
these broadcast stations to affiliate with a network is more
than offset by the increase in advertising revenue made pos-
sible by the fact that the network is now able to reach a larg-
er audience. Broadcast television thus represents a prime
example of when firms operating on one side of the market
find it economically beneficial to subsidize end users on the
other side of the market.
Furthermore,themagnitudeoftheaffiliationfeesthatthe
networkspaytobroadcaststationsisanythingbutuniform.
The precise amount varies with the relative strength of the
network and the relative strength of the broadcast station.
Stronger broadcast stations receive more, while weaker ones
receive less. Equally interesting is the fact that in recent
years, the cash flow has begun to vary in its direction as well
as magnitude, with weaker stations having to pay rather
than being paid to be part of the television network. The
dynamicnatureofthispricingregimebenefitsconsumersby
providing incentives for networks to invest in better quality
programming and by providing an incentive for stations to
provide better carriage.
The two-sided market analysis reveals the potential draw-
backs of preventing network providers from charging differ-
ential prices. As a general matter, pricing flexibility makes it
easier for network providers to recover the costs of building
additional bandwidth. Granting network providers pricing
flexibility with respect to content and application providers
should reduce the percentage of the network costs borne by
consumers. Conversely, preventing network providers from
exercising pricing flexibility with respect to content and
application providers would simply increase the proportion
of the network costs that providers must recover directly
fromendusers.Thissimultaneouslyraisesthepricespaidby
consumers and decreases the likelihood that the capital
improvementswilleverbebuilt.Chargingcontentandappli-
cation providers differential prices thus has the potential to
increase social welfare and can reduce, not increase, the bur-
den borne by consumers.
CONCLUSION
It is all too easy to forget that the Internet is not a monolith
with a brooding omnipresence overseeing the entire system.
Instead, it is a collection of autonomous systems that deter-
mine the terms of interconnection between them through a
series of arms-length negotiations. Given the Internet’s
essence as a network of networks, it should come as no sur-
prise that no two packets will pay the same amount for the
same service.
ThedevelopmentsthatIhaveoutlinedinthisarticlehave
made such differences even more likely. The network no
longer adheres to the rigid and uniform hierarchy that char-
acterized the early Internet and its predecessor, nsfnet.




network providers are experimenting with new topologies,
theyarealsoexperimentingwithnewbusinessrelationships.
Gone are the days when networks interconnected through
peeringandtransitandimposedall-you-can-eatpricingonall




differences mean that the service that any particular packet
receives and the amount that it pays will vary with the busi-
ness relationships between the networks through which it
travels. Although many observers reflexively view such devi-
ations from the status quo with suspicion, in many (if not
most)cases,theyrepresentnothingmorethanthenaturalevo-
lution of a network trying to respond to an ever-growing
diversity of customer demands. Imposing regulation that
would thwart such developments threatens to increase costs
anddiscourageinvestmentinwaysthatultimatelyworktothe
detriment of the consumers that such regulation is ostensi-
bly designed to protect.
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